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Abstract: Demand response is a key element of future power systems due to its capacity to defer 
grid investments, improve demand participation in the market, and absorb renewable energy 
source variations. In this regard, demand response can play an important role in delivering ancillary 
services to power systems. The lack of standardization and ancillary services programs prepared 
for traditional generators have blocked the participation of demand in these services. Nowadays, 
increasing needs to ensure the security of supply, renewable fluctuations, and information and 
communication technology advances are boosting the interest in demand response products to 
deliver ancillary services. While countries have had lengthy experience with these programs, others 
are starting from almost zero to develop these programs. To our knowledge, no analysis or 
standardized comparison exists of the different parameters and prices of demand response in 
ancillary services among different countries. Our study reviews more than 20 power systems 
around the world and their programs to classify them according to standard demand response 
parameters. At the end of the paper we discuss the main characteristics and prices that face demand 
response in ancillary services markets and a series of policy recommendations to policymakers to 
improve the deployment on demand participation in ancillary services. 
Keywords: demand response; ancillary services; ENTSO-E; FERC; standardization; restoration 
reserves; operation reserves 
 
1. Introduction 
Power systems are under a period of rapid evolution. The integration of renewable 
energy sources (RES) is necessary to achieve the Climate Change objectives [1], but it 
requires new solutions and more flexible power systems to achieve it at a reasonable cost 
[2]. A decentralized and dynamic paradigm is replacing the old centralized and rigid one 
[3,4]. Now, operators use all kinds of flexible resources to preserve balance, ensure the 
security of supply, and improve the efficiency of the system. New flexibility resources as 
Demand Side Management (DSM) require operators and policymakers to work together 
to create the appropriate legal and economic framework [5] and to establish the terms of 
flexibility. 
Demand Side Management (DSM) refers to planning, implementing, and monitoring 
the use of electricity to generate changes in the consumers’ demand profile to adapt to 
different needs [6,7]. DSM solutions are a valuable tool to smooth demand peaks [8], avoid 
blackouts, reduce investments on the grid [9] and absorb fluctuations of Renewable 
Energy Sources (RES) power output [10]. Nevertheless, these uses were marginal since 
power systems treated consumers as passive agents without the capacity to modify their 
loads and relied on the flexibility of fossil generators [4]. But now, when flexibility needs 
arise due to RES variability [2,11], thanks to the advances in Information and 
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Communication Technologies (ICT), DSM counts as necessary infrastructure to fully 
participate in the system flexibility throughout Demand Response Products (DRP) [12,13]. 
Demand Response Products (DRP) are not new; many countries have used this kind 
of program to accommodate them through the years with satisfactory results. The use of 
Demand Response (DR) was mainly set to avoid extreme and rare events as system 
blackouts and severe grid conditions to reduce grid decay [14]. Nowadays, the advances 
in ICT shows that DR has greater reliability to provide flexible services to the system than 
conventional generators [15]. First, DR can have lower costs than other flexible resources 
and can provide economic profits to the system as a whole and the consumers that provide 
it [16–18]. Second, DR presents an on-site solution to enable efficient integration of 
Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) that activate new market agents and open new 
business opportunities [19–21]. Third, DR can provide cheap and reliable Ancillary 
Services (AS) that were exclusively provided by generators, and as well as other 
consumer-based solutions, can help to reduce market power [22]. 
However, regulatory barriers remain an issue for the participation of demand. 
Regulatory barriers relate to market designs that limit the participation of demand, 
forcing them to participate in markets designed for generators. For instance, imposing 
large minimum bidding capacities or long time maintenance requirements that make 
difficult or even impossible the participation of most consumers [21]. To overcome the 
lack of scale, aggregators are gaining increasing attention in many policy interventions 
[23,24]. Aggregation is the activity of grouping several consumers to perform as one entity 
to respond to the operator in the market. An aggregator is an organization that deals with 
markets, System Operators (SO), and consumers, acting as the intermediary party to 
exploit the valuable resources that consumers under a contract can provide [25]. 
Therefore, power systems around the world are developing new and more dynamic 
programs to increase the participation of demand as agents, known as Balance Service 
Providers (BSP), which act as Demand Response Providers (DRPV) in direct competition 
with other BSP of other flexibility resources in the Ancillary Services (AS) markets [26] 
that are now open to DR. 
To our knowledge, no analysis or comparison exists of the different parameters and 
prices of DRP in AS among different countries. On this basis, this article aims to provide 
a reference point to policymakers and researchers that work with DRP in the AS markets 
around the world. The article provides an analysis of the different country programs 
under a framework of standardized parameters of both AS and DRP. Hence, this work 
outlines a methodology to compare different DRPs under a common language to analyze 
the benefits and drawbacks found in them, taking special attention to their main technical 
parameters and prices. Finally, some policy recommendations for new DRP are presented. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology 
used to analyze the different DRP for AS. Section 3 provides information on the DRPs of 
different power systems in the different continents. The discussion arises in Section 4, 
where a comparison between programs and prices appears. Finally, the main conclusions 
are stated in Section 5. 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1. Standards to Classify Operation Services 
Systems use different nomenclature for AS across the world. In some regions exist 
degrees of standardization created by Transmission System Operators (TSOs) from 
neighboring countries and regions. Two of the best-known are the European and the 
North American standards, developed by the European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(FERC), respectively. Figure 1 provides a summary of the described standards. 
ENTSO-E 
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ENTSO-E stands for European Network of Transmission System Operators for 
Electricity. It is an organization that represents 42 TSOs from 35 European countries. 
Among many other functions, ENTSO-E coordinates most of the European TSOs and 
drafts common network codes for the countries. The nomenclature for the European AS 
is as follows [27]: 
• Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR). This service aims to automatically stabilize 
the frequency after the occurrence of small and unpredictable imbalances. Actions 
within this type of service must start no later than 30 s from the imbalance, while the 
response covers up to 15 min. Another common name for this service is Primary 
Reserve. 
• Frequency Restoration Reserve (FRR). This service intends to respond to imbalances 
too long or too large to be solved by FCR. Therefore, its objective is to restore 
frequency and replace FCR. There are two versions of this service. 
o Automatic Frequency Restoration Reserve (aFRR). It works between 30 s and 15 
min from the frequency deviation. Also known as Secondary Reserve. 
o Manual Frequency Restoration Reserve (mFRR). It responds manually no later 
than 15 min from the imbalance. Also known as Tertiary Reserve. 
• Replacement Reserve (RR). This service complements and/or replaces FRR when 
needed. It is a complementary reserve prepared for additional imbalances, which is 
manually activated no sooner than 15 min after the frequency deviation takes place. 
FERC 
FERC stands for Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. It is “an independent 
agency that regulates the interstate transmission of electricity, natural gas, and oil” in the 
United States [28]. Included among its many responsibilities is “to protect the reliability of 
the high voltage interstate transmission system through mandatory reliability standards”. 
As part of this responsibility, the FERC has developed a nomenclature that classifies 
ancillary services over the United States and part of Canada. The services are divided into 
two groups according to the nature of the frequency disturbance. 
• Operating Services for Normal Conditions 
These services are designed to deal with unpredictable frequency deviations mainly 
caused by inaccuracy on demand prediction and/or renewables production forecasts. There 
are three types of service within this group [29]: 
o Frequency Regulation. This service is based on Automatic Generation Control 
(AGC) and responds immediately to changes in frequency. It must be fully 
activated 10 s after the frequency disturbance started, and the activation 
normally lasts from a few seconds to several minutes. 
o Regulating Reserve. AGC responds to the System Operator (SO) requests to 
bring back frequency or interchange programs to target. It must respond 
between 4 s and 1 min and lasts several minutes. 
o Load Following. This service bridges between regulation and intraday energy 
markets. It is like the Regulating Reserve but with slower starts and longer 
activity periods. It must respond between 5 and 10 min, while the activation can 
last from 10 min to a few hours. 
• Operating Services for Contingency Conditions 
These services provide a reserve to face a contingency event (predicted or not) and 
keep frequency on its normal value. At the same time, they replace other activated reserves 
so that the system returns to the same level of balance before contingency. There are three 
types of service: 
o Spinning Reserve. It is defined as unloaded generation synchronized to the grid 
(rotating mass) that can be activated in case there is a frequency deviation 
caused by a contingency. The definition includes non-synchronized capacity 
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that, by its technical traits, can be connected and activated as quickly as conven-
tional Spinning Reserves. This service activates in less than 10 min from the con-
tingency (normally much faster) and lasts up to 2 h. 
o Non-spinning Reserve. This resource has the same target as Spinning Reserve, 
but it includes offline resources that can connect and be fully active within 10 
min and work for up to 2 h. 
o Replacement or Supplemental Reserve. This service acts to restore Spinning and 
Non-Spinning reserves to the status they had before the contingency. The ser-
vice must be active 30 min after the contingency. 
 
Figure 1. Comparison of European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) nomenclature. FCR: frequency containment reserve; aFRR: automatic frequency 
restoration reserve; mFRR: manual frequency restoration reserve; RR: replacement reserve. 
2.2. Ancillary Services Parameters 
Table 1 describes the most important parameters that characterize a general AS de-
fined in [25], which Figure 2 summarises. These listed parameters consider times, power 
requested, and characteristics as the type of activation. 




Figure 2. Representation of an ancillary service’s requirements. TRES: maximum response time; 
TMAX: maximum duration; TRAM: ramp time. 
Table 1. List of Ancillary Services parameters. 
Parameter Symbol Description 
Character (optional/compulsory) n/a 
In optional services, Balance Service Providers (BSP) decide to provide or not the 
service. In such cases, BSPs normally will not receive any compensation if they chose 
not to activate their resources. Compulsory services force BSPs to provide reserve when 
asked, either by contract or as a binding auction result, resulting in fines for the non-
provision of it. 
Type of activation 
(manual/automatic) 
n/a 
Manual activation is done after the Transmission System Operator (TSO) sends a 
request so that operators apply the correspondent protocol to provide the reserve 
needed. This type of activation is frequent among services with long TRES (several 
minutes or more), such as RR and Supplemental Reserve. Automatic activation is in 
place for faster responses (a few seconds to a few minutes). 
Moment to present bids n/a 
Agents present bids up to a certain time before the action occurs (daily, weekly, 
monthly, yearly, or only when the TSO requires additional reserve). Yearly, monthly, 
and weekly auctions tend to have associated capacity payments. Sometimes, BSPs can 
modify bids up to real time. 
Notification time TNOT Moment when the TSO asks to provide the action 
Maximum Response Time TRES 
The maximum admissible time between the TSO’s notification and the BSP’s full 
activation. BSP achieves full activation when it provides all the requested reserve. 
Ramp time TRAM 
Time taken by the BSP to modify its power (either demand or production), from the 
beginning of the modification until the achievement of the targeted power. Many AS 
programs do not have any specific TRAM but are only dependent on TRES. 
Maximum duration TMAX The maximum time that the TSO can ask to sustain the action. 
Minimum capacity ΔPmin 
Minimum reserve that a BSP has to be able to provide to participate in an AS program. 
It tends to have the same value as the minimum size of a bid to be accepted in a market, 
but not always. 




There are three ways to remunerate these services. A capacity payment that rewards 
based on the amount of power that a BSP has available during a certain period. This 
price has monetary units per MW and time period. This reserve can be total or partially 
activated in case the TSO requests it, but the BSP obtains the payments regardless of its 
activity during the imbalance. An energy payment values the amount of energy 
provided by the BSP during service activation. This price has monetary units per MWh. 
Security of supply payment guarantees the energy supply without interruptions to the 
agents. 
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2.3. Demand Response parameters 
The most significant parameters that characterize a general DR product are described 
in Table 2. Technical requirements are also represented in Figure 3. 
Table 2. List of Demand Response (DR) parameters. 
Parameter Symbol Description 
Flexible power ΔPR 
This is the amount of power that the Demand Response Providers (DRPV) can increase and/or 
decrease during a response action by managing loads or turning off/on their energy sources. E1 
represents this parameter in the figure and serves to calculate the energy payment. 
Maximum length of 
the action 
TMAX,RD 
This parameter represents for how long the DRPV can keep the response action working, the 
maximum time during which the DRPV can modify its demand from the baseline. 
Time of reaction TRCT It represents the minimum time that the DRPV needs to achieve full activation of the response action 
Extra power before 
the flexibility action 
ΔPR2 
Additional maximum power that the DRPV may request before the response action to prepare its 
facility. Not all DRPVs need extra power before the action takes place. E2 represents this extra energy 
consumed during the preparation. 
Extra power after 
the flexibility action 
ΔPR3 
Additional maximum power that the DRPV may request once the response action is overdue to 
technical reasons. Not all DRPVs need extra power after the action takes place. E3 represents this extra 
energy consumed during the recovery. 
Duration of the 
preparation 
TPRE The portion of TRCT, during which the DRPV demands ΔPR2. 
Duration of the 
recovery 
TREC Time after the response action during which the DRPV demands ΔPR3. 
Flexible energy E1 
This is the amount of energy that the DRPV can consume or stop consuming during a response action 
by managing loads or turning off/on their energy sources. It serves to calculate the energy payment. 
Extra energy before 
the flexibility action 
E2 
Additional energy that the DRPV may request before the response action to prepare its facility. Not all 
DRPVs need extra energy before the action takes place. 
Extra energy after 
the flexibility action 
E3 
Additional maximum energy that the DRPV may request once the response action is overdue to 
technical reasons. Not all DRPVs need extra energy after the action takes place. 
Ramp time TRAM,RD 
The portion of TRCT used by the DRPV to adapt its consumption from the baseline to the targeted 
power. It is the time taken from the start of demand modification until the achievement of the 
targeted power. 
Operation times n/a 
Times slots when the DRPV declares that its services can be activated. This can include schedules 
depending on the day (weekday or weekend) or available days within a season, according to the 





The time that the DRPV needs to take between two consecutive actions. The time between the end of 
one action and the beginning of the next one. 
Baseline n/a 
Load curve that the DRPV would have theoretically had if it had not performed a response. It is 
crucial for the calculation of the energy payment received by the DRPV. This parameter must be 
exhaustive and clear, and the contract between the two parties must reflect it. ENERNOC presents 
different methodologies to calculate the baseline [30]. 
Type of activation n/a 
Agents activate DR either automatically or manually, depending on DRPV’s flexibility and technical 
resources. Actions can have a manual activation and still be mandatory for the DRPV. 




Figure 3. Representation of a DR action and its main parameters. 
2.4. Assessment Methodology 
Figure 4 shows the developed methodology to study and compare the different DRP. 
The first action of the developed methodology consists of the gathering and filtration of 
general information to construct a list of DRPs. For this first gathering of information, 
general reports serve as a start. DR works not only as a balancing tool but also in the spot 
markets [15]; these programs are out of the scope of this analysis. Here, the methodology 
discards all the products that do not provide AS. 
The information needs a common structure, but products coming from several TSOs 
have different parameter names when in fact, they represent the same concept due to the 
lack of standardization [31]. To homogenize this series of products, the methodology uses 
the same terms for the same concept, regardless of their original names. A list of DR pa-
rameters like the one presented in Section 2.3 has this purpose. The output of this process 
is a list of parametrized products. 
Once all products are characterized, it is possible to classify them according to the 
criterion of interest. For instance, depending on the TRCT, the method sets several inter-
vals of time and places each product on its corresponding rank. In our case, the classifica-
tion follows the ones used by FERC and ENTSO-E. First, we check what kind of services 
both nomenclatures consider and how they define each of them. After this, we compare 
our list of parametrized products with these definitions so that it was effortless, for in-
stance, to classify the European products under the American nomenclature and vice 
versa. 
After the classification, the method continues with a review of the success or failure 
of every product and relate it to their traits and circumstances. The output of this analysis 
is a series of conclusions regarding what aspects influence the effective participation of 
DR in the AS and to what extent. 




Figure 4. Proposed methodology. 
2.5. Consulted Documents 
Regarding the search for DR products, there are several reliable sources to start with; 
depending on the country of interest, the information is normally provided by the TSO or 
market operator. For a more general view, in the case of the European countries, there is 
an extensive report prepared by the Smart Energy Demand Coalition [32] with infor-
mation about DR programs from 18 different European countries. However, this report 
came out in 2017, and since DR is rapidly growing in Europe [15], some of its information 
is already out of date. 
The Regulatory Assistance Project prepared in 2013 a report which presents the his-
tory and trends of DR in the United States [33]. Another source that is interesting and 
more updated is the Independent System Operator and the Regional Transmission Or-
ganization Council’s document referenced in [34]. 
The Asia-Pacific region was reviewed by [35]. In some cases, especially when a coun-
try’s electricity system has been recently open to DR, there may not be enough information 
to correctly characterize its products. Normally, in these countries, data is very short 
and/or has no English translation. Another problem that can be even harder to tackle is 
restricted or private information. Some TSOs prepare reports with technical and economic 
data on DR regularly, but they are only available for market participants. In this case, 
unless the TSO allows the researchers to access such reports, it will be harder to identify 
the state of DR in these countries. In this case, the best possible action seems to be to use 
a secondary source, such as general reports or reviews prepared from these primary 
sources. 
Finally, DR information becomes rapidly out of date due to the quick evolution of 
electricity markets. In some cases, either because of imperfect market design, unexpected 
reactions of the stakeholders, or incapacity to encourage demand participation. Conse-
quently, TSOs may want to modify their rules or even withdraw them from the market. 
Additionally, prices and the share of demand side on AS may widely vary from one year 
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to another. To avoid using outdated information, we searched for the most recent reports 
and reviews. Furthermore, when it was possible, we contrasted data from international 
reviews with numbers in reports prepared by each TSO. In some cases, we found recent 
data on prices and energy volumes, but also old data on market rules and procedures that 
are three to six years old. In front of these situations, we assume that rules have stayed 
unchanging during the last years, adding some uncertainty to the analysis. 
3. Demand Response around the World: Main Application 
3.1. Europe 
Many European countries opened most of their AS to DR with the same rules as gen-
eration resources to compete to provide capacity. Many TSOs adjusted the technical re-
quirements of these services to match what DRPVs can do. In many other cases, TSOs only 
developed special programs for Demand Side Resources (DSR) to assure DR participation 
in front of strong competitors or too demanding technical requirements. At the end of this 
section, Tables 3–6 contain the main parameters that characterize the different programs 
open to DR in European AS markets. 
3.1.1. Belgium 
In Belgium, both FCR and mFRR are open to DR. Moreover, there is an Interruptible 
Service especially designed for load curtailment and a Strategic Reserve, in which DSR 
represented 10% of total reserves in 2017 [28]. However, AS exclude residential consumers 
even if they could provide more than 4700 MW of reserve [32]. The Belgian mFRR has two 
different resources. On the one hand, monthly bids on the market of Reserved Volumes, 
where the service only has an availability payment, and technical requirements vary be-
tween Standard R3 and Flex R3 product. The DRPV can choose which kind of product to 
offer according to their flexibility. Successful bidders in these auctions acquire the respon-
sibility to respond under TSO’s request subject to fines. On the other hand, DRPVs can 
present bids continuously on the market of Non-Reserved Volumes, up to 15 min before 
the service activation, to obtain an energy payment [33]. Regarding the Interruptible Ser-
vice, as in the case of Reserved Volumes, there are three products with different require-
ments. In all cases, the maximum response time (TRES) has the same value, but the maxi-
mum duration (TMAX) is very different from one product to another [28]. This principle 
makes it easier to match what DSRs can do with what TSO needs. 
3.1.2. Denmark 
DR activity in Denmark remains low, even if all electricity markets are open to it. A 
generator-based design and the scarce need for reserve in this country may be the main 
reasons for this slow development. Nevertheless, the constant growth of renewable ener-
gies will likely increase the necessity of DR to assure the system’s reliability. Denmark 
divides its power system into two zones. DK1, on the West, is part of the joint continental 
FCR market, while DK2, on the East, is part of the Nordic synchronous area. Therefore, 
FCR functions differently according to the corresponding zone [34]. On the contrary, 
mFRR rules are the same, regardless of the zone of application. In this service, bids can be 
upwards or downwards, but a combination of both is not acceptable. The service is remu-
nerated with an energy payment whose minimum (or maximum, for the downwards re-
serve) price is the electricity price in the spot market. 
3.1.3. Finland 
All AS accept DR in Finland, although its participation varies among the different 
services. For instance, the DR share in aFRR was absent in 2018, while in mFRR it reached 
400 MW. Close to the aFRR’s case, DR reserves on FCR added only 4 MW [36]. Some of 
the most relevant barriers identified are lack of economic benefit, absence of a communi-
cation standard, and low motivation for consumers to be involved in load management 
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[37]. Still, around 1800 MW of loads can be remotely controlled. This represents more than 
10% of peak demand in Finland, which in 2014 reached 14,200 MW. FCR is procured 
through an annual and hourly market, in both cases paid with an availability payment 
only. In the annual auction, BSPs receive the price for their reserves, which will vary from 
one day to the next one, and the Finnish TSO acquires all usable capacity at the price de-
termined in the auction. On the other hand, other BSPs can present bids with their reserves 
daily, and the TSO purchases only the amount needed [38]. There is a Strategic Reserve 
used to compensate for higher demand in winter. Technical requirements are like mFRR, 
and the remuneration is agreed upon in a private contract. In 2018, DR reached 22 MW of 
capacity in this service [36]. 
3.1.4. France 
France was one of the first European countries to open its electricity markets to DR. 
In 2003, industrial consumers were already able to offer their flexibility on the balancing 
mechanism. In 2011, mFRR opened to DR, and in 2018, it accounted for more than 50% of 
the Rapid Reserve. Since 2014, industrial consumers larger than 1 MW have got the chance 
to participate in FCR [39]. The energy used in the French balancing mechanism, all pro-
vided by DR reached 22 GWh in 2018, and the maximum DR reserve activated simultane-
ously exceeded 1000 MW [39]. There is also a mechanism in France called “Demand Re-
sponse Call for Tenders”, designed to promote DR development. It is closed for conven-
tional means of self-generation, and consumers already benefited from the Interruptible 
Load service. The total capacity provided by this mechanism reached 2900 MW in 2020. 
In aFRR, BSPs have three products, each of which has its own TRES requirement. Bids in 
this service require symmetry and activate at the pro rata of the BSP’s obligation. On the 
other hand, mFRR and RR have very similar traits, with the biggest difference in TRES and 
the price of the payments, being RR cheaper as it is a less demanding service (higher TRES). 
3.1.5. Germany 
Germany has a strong industrial sector that has a potential of 6.4 GW DR capacity 
available for 1 h at least [40], with DR investments around 10 times smaller than capacity 
provided by traditional generation, while operation and maintenance costs are dependent 
on each manufacturing process [41]. Estimations show that the tertiary sector could pro-
vide up to 3.8 GW [42]. FCR, aFRR, and mFRR services are all open to DR, and there is an 
Interruptible Service especially designed for DSRs. aFRR bids are weekly presented in a 
joint market with Austria. The service requires full availability for 12 h a day and a mini-
mum size of the bid of 5 MW (1 MW if only one bid is presented) [43], but these requisites 
will be modified soon to fit more DR to AS [32]. mFRR auctions occur only during week-
days, and availability is required for 4 h instead of 12. It is possible that coming changes 
would make new aFRR’s design more like current mFRR’s. 
3.1.6. Ireland 
The rapid growth of wind energy in Ireland has created an increasing need for flexi-
bility, so the Irish TSO works on specific programs to take advantage of DSRs. In 2017, 19 
DRPVs were registered to provide a reserve, with a total capacity of 362 MW [44]. Demand 
Side Units (DSUs) are DRPVs participating in the capacity market, with a reserve no 
smaller than 4 MW that can be aggregated from smaller units, not subject to further size 
limitations. These units are asked to manually modify their load curve with a TRES of 1 h, 
and they will be rewarded with an annual capacity payment since they must be available 
any day, at any time. Powersave is a service designed to reduce load when total demand 
is close to the available generation capacity. DRPVs with a reserve no smaller than 0.1 MW 
can participate during working days in exchange for an energy payment [32]. 
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3.1.7. .The Netherlands 
Most of the AS in the Netherlands are open to DR. In 2017, the Dutch TSO purchased 
1.5 GW of capacity provided by DSRs, with a total activation of 500 GWh. Distribution 
System Operators and retailers are starting to see demand management as an attractive 
business [32]. One particularity of aFRR in the Netherlands is its activation logic. When 
the TSO detects an ordinary frequency deviation, it activates the reserves by merit order, 
so that only those BSPs who presented the cheapest bids are activated. However, if the 
TSO detects an “extraordinary” deviation, it will activate all resources at the pro rata of 
the BSP’s obligation to achieve the biggest possible power ramp [45]. This solves the con-
tingency faster, and BSPs get a higher energy payment. There is also a capacity payment 
determined in an annual auction. The Dutch mFRR services treat upward and downward 
reserves separately. A single unit can only present one type of reserve, while groups of 
BSPs can participate in both markets at the same time. Consumers with a contracted 
power of 60 MW or higher must present their reserves in mFRR. TRES and the calculation 
of the price for the energy payment are different for upward and downward reserves. 
Such prices depend on the spot market price. 
3.1.8. Sweden 
Sweden is divided into four zones, SE1, SE2, SE3, and SE4. Sometimes certain param-
eters of AS vary within those zones. Sweden is a country with large water resources, and 
its capacity reserves come from northern hydroelectric plants. Some thermal plants also 
activate when there is a congestion problem or during peak load periods. Swedish FCR, 
aFRR, and mFRR are all open to DR and aggregation, but sometimes technical require-
ments prevent many DRPVs from participating in them. For instance, the minimum ca-
pacity (ΔPmin) is 5 MW in SE4 and 10 MW in the rest of the country, making it difficult for 
most consumers to meet such requirements and enter the mFRR market. The service has 
an energy payment only [32]. There is a Strategic Reserve to be 25% provided by DSRs. 
The technical requirements of the Strategic Reserve are like mFRR’s, but the service has a 
capacity and an energy payment. 
3.1.9. Switzerland 
In 2013, Switzerland became one of the most advanced countries in DR development 
in Europe. The legislation clearly defines BSP’s roles and mitigates costs and risks. The 
closure of nuclear power plants and water scarcity may increase the need for flexibility in 
Switzerland in the coming years [46]. All AS are open to DR and aggregation, and in 2017 
[47], DR provided 3 MW of reserve in FCR, 10 MW in aFRR, and 49 MW in mFRR [32]. 
aFRR in Switzerland has some particularities. Bids take place in a weekly auction and 
must be symmetric, while the activation occurs at the pro rata of the BSP’s obligation. 
ΔPmin is 5 MW, and the remuneration is based on a capacity payment dependent on the 
weekly auction and an energy payment dependent on the spot market price [48]. Bids for 
mFRR take place weekly and daily. The weekly auction accepts bids for any hour during 
the week, while the daily auction has six blocks of 4 h. Products do not have to be sym-
metric in this service, but they must be larger than 5 MW too. TRES depends on the direction 
of the reserve (upwards or downwards) and the type of auction [48]. 
3.1.10. United Kingdom 
Most of the British ASs are open to DR and aggregation, although its participation 
remains low in some of them. The British TSO adjusted several market rules and require-
ments to increase this participation that had as main barriers to the complexity and excess 
of regulatory changes [32]. Demand Turn Up is a service designed to decrease generation 
or increase consumption in times of low demand and high renewable generation. The ac-
tivation of this service can only be done within a certain schedule, and TRES and TMAX do 
not have fixed values but are based on what each BSP can offer. In 2018, 115 MW of reserve 
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provided this service, with total usage of 1465 MWh. Short-Term Operating Reserve 
(STOR) used to be the most important program in the UK, but decreasing prices have 
discouraged many DRPVs from participating in it. This service is like ENTSO-E’s stand-
ard Supplemental Reserve. There are three different products within the STOR program, 
with technical traits and a reward based on capacity and an energy payment. Annual auc-
tions of BSPs determine prices for the next seasons [49]. The Fast Reserve demands a ΔPmin 
of 25 MW, where only very large consumers can access it and compete with generators 
and storage units. Rapid Reserve’s technical requirements make it like aFRR, and the ser-
vice rewards three concepts: capacity, energy, and nomination. Nomination payment de-
pends on the time provided and not on actual activation nor capacity provided [50,51]. 
Table 3. FCR programs in Europe open to DR: Main parameters. 
Product/Service (Country) 
Type of 
Activation TRES ΔPmin TMAX 
Type(s) of 
Payment 
RR (France) Manual 30 min 10 MW 90 min 
Capacity and 
energy 
Demand Turn Up (United 
Kingdom) 
Manual Variable, Average: 
6 h 
1 MW Variable, Average: 
4.5h 
Energy only 
Short-Term Operating Reserve 
(STOR) (United Kingdom) 
Manual Variable, 20 min–4 
h 
3 MW n/a (min: 2 h) Capacity and 
energy 
Interruptible Service (Belgium) Manual 15 min 5 MW 4–12 h Capacity only 
Strategic demand reserve 
(Belgium) 
Manual 90 min 1 MW 4 h Capacity and 
energy 
FCR(Finland) Automatic 3 min 0.1 
MW 
n/a Capacity and 
energy 
FCR (Sweden) Automatic 3 min 0.1 
MW 
n/a Capacity and 
energy 
Table 4. aFRR programs in Europe open to DR: Main parameters. 
Product/Service (Country) Type of Activation TRES ΔPmin TMAX Type(s) of Payment 
aFRR (France) Automatic 60–100 s 1 MW n/a Capacity and energy 
aFRR (Germany) Automatic 5 min 5 MW n/a Capacity and energy 
aFRR (The Netherlands) Automatic >30 s 1 MW 15 min Capacity and energy 
aFRR (Sweden) Automatic 120 s 5 MW n/a (min 1 h) Capacity and energy 
aFRR (Switzerland) Automatic 200 s 5 MW n/a Capacity and energy 
Rapid Reserve (United Kingdom) Automatic 2 min 25 MW 15 min Nomination, capacity, and energy 
Table 5. mFRR programs in Europe open to DR: Main parameters. 
Product/Service (Country) Type of Activation TRES ΔPmin TMAX Type(s) of Payment 
mFRR-Reserved Volumes (Belgium) Manual 15 min 1 MW 2–8 h Capacity only 
mFRR-Non-Reserved Volumes (Belgium) Manual 15 min 1 MW 2–8 h Energy only 
mFRR (Denmark) Manual 15 min 5 MW n/a Energy only 
mFRR (Finland) Manual 15 min 5 MW n/a Capacity and energy 
Strategic Reserve (Finland) Manual 15 min 10 MW n/a According to contract 
mFRR (France) Manual 13 min 10 MW 2 h Capacity and energy 
mFRR (Germany) Manual 15 min 1MW 4 h Capacity and energy 
mFRR (The Netherlands) Manual 10–15 min 20 MW 1 h Energy only 
mFRR (Sweden) Manual 15 min 10 MW n/a Energy only 
Strategic Reserve (Sweden) Manual 15 min 5 MW n/a Capacity and energy 
mFRR (Switzerland) Manual 15–35 min 5 MW n/a Capacity and energy 
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Table 6. RR programs in Europe open to DR: Main parameters. 
Product/Service (Country) 
Type of 
Activation TRES ΔPmin TMAX 
Type(s) of 
Payment 
Interruptible Service (Belgium) Manual 15 min 5 MW 4–12 h Capacity only 
Strategic demand reserve 
(Belgium) Manual 90 min 1 MW 4 h 
Capacity and 
energy 
RR (France) Manual 30 min 
10 
MW 90 min 
Capacity and 
energy 
Demand Turn Up (United 
Kingdom) Manual 
Variable, Average: 
6 h 1 MW 
Variable, Average: 
4.5 h Energy only 
STOR (United Kingdom) Manual 
Variable, 20 min–4 
h 
3 MW n/a (min: 2 h) 
Capacity and 
energy 
3.2. North America 
Many North American systems allow DR to access AS markets with similar rules 
than generation resources to compete to provide capacity. Several TSOs adjusted the tech-
nical requirements of these services to match what DRPVs can do. In many other cases, 
TSOs developed only special programs for DSRs to assure DR participation in front of 
strong competitors or too demanding technical requirements. At the end of this Section, 
Tables 7 and 8 contain the main parameters that characterize North American AS for DR. 
3.2.1. California Independent System Operator (CAISO) 
California Independent System Operators (CAISOs) DRPs participate directly in the 
region capacity market jointly with the other products [52,53], and California DSOs have 
maintained traditional load disruption and load shifting programs [54]. California has 
1612 MW of DR resources in economic programs that reduce the load based on anticipated 
offset prices in real-time markets [55]. The most relevant DRP in the region is a Load Fol-
lowing Service, which is part of the CAISO regulator. As in most of the country’s products, 
aggregation is allowed. The remuneration is based on a capacity payment where CAISO, 
in accordance with clients, must agree when they have to offer the service. In turn, and 
depending on the agreement signed, they are notified in advance in the Day-Ahead Mar-
ket (13:00), and in Real Time (based on the offer options): 2.5 min, 22.5 min, 52.5 min. The 
TREC depends on the parameters of the resources used. Other relevant products of the elec-
tricity system have also been developed from different TSOs and DSOs in California. The 
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PGE), Southern California Edison Company (SCE), and 
San Diego Gas and Electric Company (SDGE) have also specific programs used during 
critical periods of demand, contributing to load shifting. 
3.2.2. Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) 
The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) has several DRP that participate in 
AS like Non-Spinning Reserve Services, Supplemental Reserve Services (Climate-sensi-
tive, Non-climate-sensitive, and Load Resource), and Regulation Services [56,57]. Due to 
its climatic conditions and particularities, ERCOT has a different range of DRP regarding 
if they occur on a normal basis or under specific climatic conditions. The Non-Climate-
sensitive products can be identified as Non-Spinning Reserve and Supplemental Reserve, 
which features a ΔPmin of 100 kW and a minimum reduction amount of 100 kW for both 
TRAM options, 10 min or 30 min. Remuneration is in the form of security of supply, the TMAX 
will last 12 h, and the period in which customers must offer the service will be established 
based on the service paid time [58]. The Climate-sensitive products are similar to the pre-
vious ones, with the main differences that Climate-sensitive programs are used during the 
peak loads in summer and winter seasons, have a ΔPmin of 500 kW with a minimum re-
duction amount of 500 kW and a shorter TMAX of 3 h. The Non-Spinning Reserve Service 
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“Load Resource” has similar characteristics as the Non-Spinning Reserve/Non-Climate-
sensitive service, with the differences that aggregation is not allowed, the TMAX where the 
period in which customers must offer the service will be an agreed interval is shorter and 
the TRAM is 10 min (Verbal), 30 cycles (Retransmission) [59]. The Regulation Service does 
not allow aggregation, the remuneration will be in the form of security of supply, and the 
period in which customers must offer the service will be an agreed interval [59]. 
3.2.3. New England Independent System Operator (NE-ISO) 
The New England Independent System Operator (NE-ISO) spent many years design-
ing the first installed capacity market in the country [60]. With the adoption of the direct 
capacity market, DR could participate directly in the market, and two capacity programs 
were established: real-time demand response and real-time emergency generation. Real-
time demand response refers to a reduction in energy use at an end-use customer’s facil-
ity, while Real-time Emergency Generation refers to a customer-controlled on-site gener-
ator, which has environmental permits that limit its operation to “emergency” hours when 
the system operator calls them to avoid lowering the load. The NE-ISO offers several pro-
grams that are active today. Regarding AS managed by the NE-ISO, Regulation Services 
are the main activity to handle demand flexibility, and they include seasonal and no sea-
sonal products [61]. The Regulation service products have a common ΔPmin of 100 kW, a 
minimum reduction amount of 1 kW. The period in which customers must offer the ser-
vice could be seasonal and in peak hours, in summer between June and August (14:00 to 
17:00) and in winter from December to January (18:00 to 19:00) or in summer between June 
and August and in winter from December to January, on non-holiday days. The notifica-
tion of the action is defined by market regulators, which inform the members of the pro-
gram some months or years in advance on when they must provide the service. Therefore, 
the contract includes a capacity payment on an annual basis [62,63]. 
3.2.4. Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) 
The Midcontinent Independent System Operator (MISO) is a TSO responsible for 
managing 180 GW of installed power to supply around 670 TWh of electricity to 42 million 
people each year [64]. MISO distinguishes between two types of DRPV. Type I supplies a 
fixed reserve by load curtailment only, and it does not have generation resources. Type II 
supplies a continuous range of reserve through load curtailment or self-generation [65]. 
Regarding AS managed by MISO, Regulation, Spinning Reserve, and Supplementary Re-
serve are all open to DR, with a common ΔPmin of 1 MW. Regulation is only open to DRPV 
type I and requires a very demanding TRES (4 s). BSPs must respond automatically to de-
viations in frequency and provide both upwards and downwards reserve [66]. Spinning 
Reserve and Supplementary Reserve are open to DRPV type I and type II. Any DRPV 
qualified for Regulation is qualified for Spinning Reserve too, and any DRPV qualified for 
Spinning Reserve is also qualified for Supplementary Reserve [66]. This is due to the re-
spective technical requirements of each service since Regulation is the most demanding 
while Supplementary Reserve is the least. 
3.2.5. New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) 
The New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) manages its Installed Capac-
ity Market to guarantee the adequacy of the resources for its territory of a state with a 
maximum load of just over 33,000 MW [67]. The operator of the New York Independent 
System (NYISO) offers four DR programs that could be identified as Spinning Reserve 
Service, Regulation Service, and two Supplemental Reserve Services [68]. The DRPs of 
Spinning Reserve Service, the first Supplemental Reserve Service, and the Regulation Ser-
vice have a ΔPmin of 1 MW, a minimum reduction amount of 1 MW. The remuneration is 
economic (based on the capacity provided) in the three programs, the action lasts the es-
tablished interval (between NYISO and the agent), and the period in which the clients 
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must offer the service is continuous. Prior notification is made in the Daily Market (11:00) 
and in real time (75 min, 5 min if Regulation Service). The second Supplemental Reserve 
Service has a ΔPmin of 100 kW (per zone), a minimum reduction amount of 100 kW (per 
zone). Remuneration is in the form of security of supply, the action will be during the 
window of action established by the program, and the period in which customers must 
offer the service will be seasonal. It is advisable to make a prior notification in the Daily 
Market, and a prior notice will be made on the day of the action (120 min) [68] 
3.2.6. Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection LLC (PJM) 
The Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection LLC (PJM) manages a total 
of 13 states with more than 65 million people. It also has an installed generation capacity 
of 180 GW, and the total energy delivered in 2018 was 807 TWh [69]. There are mainly 
three AS open to DR: Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve, Synchronized Reserves, and Regu-
lation, in which DRSs can provide up to 25%, 33%, and 25% of the total capacity, respec-
tively [70]. Day-Ahead Scheduling Reserve has the traits of Supplementary Reserve. In all 
cases, ΔPmin is very accessible (0.1 MW), but DRPVs must send information regarding their 
consumption every 1 min [71]. Regarding Synchronized Reserves, DRPVs present bids in 
a Day-Ahead or in an Intraday market. In 2017, the average DR hourly capacity activated 
was 110 MW, from which 76% were industrial loads, while the participation of residential 
loads remained very limited. On the contrary, regulation, which activates as soon as pos-
sible, had a remarkable share of residential loads. 79% of DSRs in this service in 2017 came 
from water heaters, and 9% came from batteries. The average DR hourly capacity pro-
vided was 10 MW. 
3.2.7. Canada—Independent Electricity System Operator (Ontario) 
The Canadian State of Manitoba belongs to MISO’s electricity system, so all its pro-
grams and market rules apply in this State too. On the other hand, Alberta Electricity Sys-
tem Operator contracted 150 MW of DR in 2011 with Enel X, and now, a new advance on 
DR development as reserves is being contracted by Enel X on the basis of 10 to 60 min 
contracts with particulars through bids on the day ahead [72]. Apart from Ontario, the 
rest of the States are still vertically regulated. Independent Electricity System Operator 
(IESO) launched the first Demand Response auction in 2015. Before that, IESO had secured 
up 70 MW of DR through a competitive procurement in which bids as small as 1 MW were 
accepted. The project intended to assess DSRs ability to provide ancillary services. The 
loads participated in one program [73]. DRPVs commit to curtailing their loads on a day-
ahead or four-hours ahead basis, acting like a Supplemental Reserve. IESO manages an 
annual DR auction in which DRPVs present bids with the capacity they are willing to 
provide for a defined period. DR offers are expressed in $/MW month or year, and suc-
cessful providers will receive a payment according to the capacity awarded and the re-
sulting clearing price [74]. 
Table 7. Normal FERC programs in North America open to DR: Main parameters. 
Product/Service (TSO) Type of Activation TRES ΔPmin TMAX Type(s) of Payment 
Load Following (CAISO) Manual 10 min 0.5 MW n/a Capacity only 
Regulating Reserve (ERCOT) Manual Immediate 0.1 MW n/a Security of supply 
Regulating Reserve (NE-ISO) Automatic Immediate 0.1 MW n/a Capacity only 
Regulating Reserve (MISO) Automatic 4 s 1 MW 60 min n/a 
Regulating Reserve (NYISO) Automatic Immediate 1 MW n/a Capacity only 
Regulating Reserve (PJM) Automatic Immediate 0.1 MW n/a Capacity and energy 
CAISO: California independent service operator; ERCOT: electric reliability council of Texas; NE-ISO: New England independent 
service operator; MISO: Midcontinent independent system operator; NYISO: New York independent system operator; PJM: Penn-
sylvania-New Jersey-Maryland interconnection LLC. 
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Table 8. Contingency FERC programs in North America open to DR: Main parameters. 
Product/Service (TSO) Type of Activation TRES ΔPmin TMAX Type(s) of Payment 
Spinning Reserve (MISO) Manual 10 min 1 MW n/a n/a 
Spinning Reserve (NYISO) Manual 10 min 1 MW n/a Capacity only 
Non-Spinning Reserve (ERCOT) Manual 10 min 0.1 MW 12 h Security of supply 
Non-Spinning Reserve (ERCOT) Manual 10 min 0.5 MW 3 h Security of supply 
Non-Spinning Reserve (ERCOT) Manual 10 min 0.1 MW 3 h Security of supply 
Supplemental Reserve (ERCOT) Manual 30 min 0.1 MW 12 h Security of supply 
Supplemental Reserve (ERCOT) Manual 30 min 0.5 MW 3 h Security of supply 
Supplementary Reserve (MISO) Manual 10 min 1 MW n/a n/a 
Supplemental Reserve (NYISO) Manual 30 min 1 MW n/a Capacity only 
Supplemental Reserve (NYISO) Manual 2 h 0.1 MW n/a Capacity only 
Day Ahead Scheduling Reserve (PJM) Manual 30 min 0.1 MW n/a n/a 
Synchronized Reserves (PJM) Manual 10 min 0.1 MW 30 min n/a 
3.3. Asia and Oceania 
In Asia and Oceania, systems partially allow DR to access AS markets to compete 
with generation resources. Some TSOs adjusted the technical requirements of these ser-
vices to match what DRPVs can do. But mostly, TSOs developed special programs only 
for DSRs, to assure DR participation in front of strong competitors or too demanding tech-
nical requirements. At the end of this Section, Table 9 contains the main parameters that 
characterize Asia and Oceania AS for DR. 
3.3.1. Australia 
Australia has a highly branched and poorly meshed electrical network that suffers 
from imbalances that dramatically increase prices [75]. One of the measures taken to carry 
a decentralization of energy production is to invest in flexibility to provide AS, which 
represents an opportunity to demand [76]. The service that most concerns DR is the Fre-
quency Control AS-, which Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO) uses to maintain 
the adequate frequency of the electrical system. There are two types of frequency control 
in Australia: Regulatory and Contingency. The regulatory control of the frequency pre-
sents two programs whose objective is to correct slight drops and rises that may impair 
the optimal functioning of the system [77]. As for contingency programs, two types exist 
depending on the ramp of action required by the action, and in FERC’s nomenclature, 
they would be identified as Regulating Reserves and Load Following Services. 
3.3.2. New Zealand 
New Zealand is another country that has been investing in the implantation of re-
newable energies and monitoring infrastructures [78], and betting progressively on de-
mand flexibility. The first projects were based in the residential sector, which is controlled 
through monitoring-controlled air conditioning, lighting, and certain household appli-
ances during peak loads [79]. The New Zealand Electricity Authority (NZEA) is the regu-
latory organization for the country’s electricity market and is, in turn, the promoter of 
different demand-side flexibility pilot projects. NZEA is currently working on defining 
AS and DR for the country due to the great number of renewable resources installed, 
which proves great potential for demand flexibility in New Zealand. 
  




The State Electricity Regulatory Commission (SERC), together with the National En-
ergy Commission (NEC), oversees promoting and implementing projects that provide 
greater demand flexibility, thus improving the potential of the electric system. Various 
demand management programs have been implemented by the Chinese government, 
which focus on administrative and technical measures. Pilot demand management pro-
grams have been carried out in four major cities in the country (Suzhou, Beijing, Foshan, 
and Tangshan) [80]. These programs require an advanced measurement infrastructure 
(AMI) to measure baseline and consumption in real time and communication devices to 
inform users of Smart Demand Response (SDR) activities and analyze their reduction 
commitment [81]. SDR refers to DR products managed automatically by the country’s 
large telematic infrastructure, which is adapted to the needs, prices, and system circum-
stances. The two most important SDR programs are the Interruptible Loads program and 
the Direct Load Control program. Both receive the same economic incentive in exchange 
for energy reduction. The mentioned programs can compare to FERC Supplemental Re-
serve Services standards. 
3.3.4. South Korea 
Currently, the effective DR program in Korea is not based on a system of offers but 
on contracts that decide the incentives, the participation interval, the notification time of 
the event, etc. However, a bid-based DR program was recently conducted but did not 
have a major impact [82]. The need for a DSM program is becoming a major problem in 
Korea and is recognized as a necessary element to solve the demand problem [83]. The 
load management programs implemented since 2009 in Korea use the regular KPX (Ko-
rean Power Exchange) fund bidding system and a voluntary reduction of the summer 
load, which KEPCO (Korean Electric Power Corporation) coordinates and carries out dur-
ing the summer holiday period [84]. Coordination of the summer vacation period is used 
to reduce peak summer demand; its objective is the residential client and the industrial 
client that surpasses a demand of 100 kW (ΔPmin) with an economic incentive. The Load 
Following Service reduces demand during peak summer afternoon hours are targeted to 
residential, industrial, and educational customers, who receive an economic incentive that 
is paid in 30 min rates (TMAX) depending on the power provided. This system contributes 
to reducing maximum demand, but it will be more difficult to implement since industry 
labor regularity is more important than the decrease in the price of electricity in an ad-
vanced country. Through these satisfactory experiences, South Korea is willing to con-
tinue carrying out DR projects and demand flexibility. 
3.3.5. Japan 
The catastrophes that occurred in the country caused the nation to feel threatened by 
the serious lack of electricity supply. These events sparked the national debate regarding 
nuclear energy and the approach it should take in the future [85], and one of the measures 
that were decided to tackle was to encourage the flexibility of the demand for a better 
insertion of renewable energies. A unique feature of the Japanese approach is the promis-
ing role of the business sector, as some of the large Japanese conglomerates such as Toyota, 
Mitsubishi, Sharp, Toshiba, Fujitsu, Panasonic, NEC Corporation, and Nissan Motors are 
involved in these projects. Notwithstanding the absence of defined DR programs, due to 
the massive industry trying to incorporate demand flexibility to their standards, there is 
great potential for DR in Japan. The main obstacle is found in the massive financing that 
the deployment of means that the creation of an intelligent network requires; this has been 
identified as a key barrier for DR [86]. 
  




The Singapore Energy Market Authority (EMA) is responsible for demand easing 
projects and introduced DR programs to improve competition in the Singapore National 
Electricity Market (NEMS). Consumers can participate directly or through DR retailers or 
aggregators. The Load Following Service establishes that all customers who can offer a 
ΔPmin of 0.1 MW for half an hour (TMÁX) can participate. Consumers participating in the 
program share a third of the savings from lowering electricity prices as incentive pay-
ments, up to the limit on wholesale electricity prices. Registered consumers can temporar-
ily provide the required reduction by turning off non-critical equipment, reducing HVAC 
or pumping system power, or even using backup generators on-site for short periods. 
Table 9. Asian and Oceanian ancillary services open to DR: Main parameters. 
Product/Service (Country) Type of Activation TRES ΔPmin TMAX Type(s) of Payment 
Regulating Reserve (Australia) Manual 60 s 0.1 MW n/a Capacity only 
Load Following (Australia) Manual 5 min 0.1 MW n/a Capacity only 
Load Following (South Korea) Manual n/a 0.1 MW 30 min Capacity only 
Load Following (Singapore) Manual n/a 0.1 MW 30 min Capacity only 
3.4. Africa and Latin America 
Africa and Latin America are also regions with a great DR potential, but DR pro-
grams have not yet been developed. Nevertheless, countries like South Africa are investi-
gating and proving the viability of demand side management and the regulation of elec-
tricity demand from the consumer side [87]. 
4. Discussion 
As it is proved with the range of DR products from different continents presented in 
this review, many countries all over the world have developed and keep improving their 
programs to manage DSRs. DR is one of the elements which are going to characterize 
electricity markets shortly. A new perspective of decentralized systems, based on Renew-
able Energy, Distributed Energy Resources, Smart Grids, Virtual Power Plant, and Aggre-
gators, is dominating the debate on how future electricity systems should be, and DR is 
an essential part of such scenario. The sooner and more efficiently DR is properly imple-
mented in a system’s electricity market, the sooner its society will benefit from it, so it is 
recommendable for all regions to start working on programs like these shortly. 
As it is stated in Section 2.1, neighboring countries tend to have similar market de-
signs when it comes to general services. Commonly they even create their nomenclature 
so that communication between such countries becomes easier and collaboration is more 
profitable. On the other hand, every TSO has its strategies to face particular issues of its 
country and, consequently, it designs specific DR products to manage them. For instance, 
Strategic Reserve in Finland is specially designed to face high winter demands, and De-
mand Turn Up in the UK is used in times of low demand and high renewable generation. 
These services are uncommon in other countries without such issues. 
Regarding ΔPmin in AS programs open to DR, the most repeated value is 1 MW, espe-
cially in Europe. Other countries in Asia, America, and Oceania show ΔPmin of 0.1 MW in 
their programs, a more flexible requirement that facilitates DSRs participation on AS. Nor-
mally, aggregators can overcome a technical barrier such as this, but with ΔPmin of 20 or 
25 MW (as found in Europe), even aggregators have difficulties meeting the requirements, 
and only the largest industrial consumers can access those services. 
The search for DR products has revealed a pending global issue: the lack of stand-
ardization. TSOs from diverse parts of the world use different terms for similar concepts 
and design AS in a distinct way. Therefore, it often becomes hard to understand a descrip-
tion of a service from another part of the world. Besides, this fact can make it impossible 
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to apply the same strategy to manage loads in two different countries because technical 
requirements may not be met in both places. Research shows that countries with stand-
ardization, such as European countries or the USA, tend to develop appropriate DR pro-
grams more quickly. Nevertheless, even if organizations like ENTSO-E and FERC have 
worked to develop a regional nomenclature accepted by all nearby countries, the stand-
ardization must become global to accelerate DR growth all over the world. 
Regarding prices for the remuneration of AS provided by DSRs, the prices presented 
must be considered as an approximation since most of them vary continuously. All energy 
prices presented refer to upwards activations, that is, a curtailment of load or an increment 
of generation: 
• aFRR or Secondary Reserve. In services classified as aFRR, most of the European 
TSOs offer availability and an energy payment. Prices for the availability concept are 
around 18 €/MW/h (France), 13 €/MW/h (Finland), 22 €/MW/h (Switzerland) and 
even 200 €/MW/h (the UK). Prices for the energy concept are around 20–40 €/MWh 
(Finland), 70 €/MWh over the spot market price (the Netherlands), and 50 €/MWh 
(Switzerland). 
• mFRR or Tertiary Reserve. TSOs typically pay successful activations of mFRR and 
similar services with an energy payment only, although there are some exceptions. 
Prices found for the availability payment are around 5–6 €/MW/h (Belgium) and 3 
€/MW/h (Finland). For the energy payment, average prices are around 47 €/MWh 
(France) and 41 €/MWh (Sweden). In Denmark and The Netherlands, the minimum 
price is the correspondent spot market price, and in the latter, there is an upper limit 
of 200 €/MWh. 
• RR or Complementary Reserve. As with the mFRR case, most TSOs pay this service 
with an energy payment only. Typical prices for the availability payment are around 
2 €/MW/h (the UK) and 7 €/MW/h (Ireland), and for energy, the payment is around 
45 €/MWh (France), 73 €/MWh (the UK), 75 €/MWh (Belgium) and between 380–950 
€/MWh (Ireland). 
Rewards tend to be more generous when the service is more demanding. That ex-
plains why aFRR normally has two payments, and mFRR and RR typically only have a 
utilization payment. Prices are also higher when technical requirements are tougher. En-
ergy payments are especially common in Europe, while most DR services in other conti-
nents tend to apply for a capacity payment only. Security of supply is an interesting way 
to remunerate DR actions, although it would only apply to countries with weak and tricky 
networks, being an insufficient reward otherwise. 
DR’s success and participation on AS are more common in services with high TRES, 
such as mFRR and equivalents, but consumers are getting involved in FCR and aFRR gen-
tly. In the USA most of the services characterized are equivalent to the spinning reserve, 
but there are also many products designed to be triggered immediately, probably due to 
the earlier use of DSRs to provide AS. 
DR’s success is dependent on several factors, such as load traits (residential, indus-
trial, and commercial), the share of renewables in a country’s electricity system, or gener-
ator competition. A key aspect results from the inclusion of residential consumers in DR 
programs, which are currently excluded from many markets such as Belgium. This will 
result from the integration and massification of aggregation services as a key element to 
untap the residential flexibility as it occurs in most USA systems and South Korea. 
To improve the possibility of DR prosperity, all these factors must be analyzed before 
the design of products, and the conclusions of such analysis must be considered when 
establishing technical requirements and new market rules. Still, experience proves that 
some aspects are essential for a prosperous DR progress, such as low ΔPmin, and the ac-
knowledgment of independent aggregators. Moreover, products’ impact on market effi-
ciency and DR development must be tracked to introduce the changes needed. 




To conclude, DR proves to be a valuable resource to ensure the security of supply 
while reducing demand peaks, avoid blackouts, reduce investments on the grid, and ab-
sorb renewable fluctuations. To do so, programs to allow and enhance the participation 
of DR in AS have been occurring throughout the globe. Many countries aim to mobilize 
their demand resources to provide reserves and directly compete with generation in AS 
markets. DR usage is still scarce, and, in most countries, its deployment is low or inexistent 
due to inexistent regulation, technical parameters drafted for generators, and lack of ex-
perience. Even though most countries follow regional grid standards, where DR programs 
for AS exist, these do not follow common parameters and lack standardization due to the 
different parameters involved as a DRPV. In this regard, no analysis or comparison ap-
pears in the literature of the different parameters and prices of DRP in AS among different 
countries. 
The contribution of this work is to provide an academic, precise, and concise analysis 
of the different country programs under a framework of standardized parameters of both 
AS and DRP. First, the paper has defined the grid standards developed by ENTSO-E and 
the FERC, the AS associated with them, and their main technical characteristics. Second, 
we have presented the DRP existing in the different countries and systems around the 
world that have incorporated DRP in their AS. The programs are presented systematically 
with their main characteristics such as the minimum response time, the type of payment 
and activation form, minimum and maximum times, minimum power required to partic-
ipate, and if aggregation is allowed or not. Third, a review of the average and most com-
mon prices and forms of payment and the main policy conclusions around the programs 
are presented. Our work shows how countries with wider participation have lower mini-
mum power levels and allow aggregation. It is important to note that higher penetrations 
of renewables, the electrification of demand, and more extreme climate conditions associ-
ated with the effects of climate change will impose extra needs on the system, to which 
DR results in a valuable resource to help to balance it. 
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aFRR Frequency Restoration Reserves with Automatic Activation 
AGC Automatic Generation Control 
AS Ancillary Services 
BSP Balance Service Providers 
CAISO California Independent System Operator 
DEG Distributed Energy Generation 
DER Distributed Energy Resources 
DR Demand Response 
DRPV Demand Response Provider 
DRRQ Demand Response Requester 
DSR Demand Side Resources 
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DSM Demand Side Management 
ENTSO-E European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity 
ERCOT Electric Reliability Council of Texas 
FCR Frequency Containment Reserve 
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
FRR Frequency Restoration Reserve 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
ISO Independent System Operator (in USA) 
mFRR Frequency Restoration Reserves with Manual Activation 
MISO Midcontinent Independent System Operator 
NE-ISO New England Independent System Operator 
NYISO New York Independent System Operator 
PJM Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland Interconnection LLC 
RR Replacement Reserve 
RTO Regional Transmission Organization (in USA) 
SO System Operator 
STOR Short-Term Operating Reserve 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
ΔPmin 
Minimum capacity that needs to be demonstrated by a BSP to access a specific ancillary 
service 
TMAX Maximum length of a DR action 
TRES Maximum admissible time between a TSO’s notification and a BSP’s full activation 
TRAM 
Maximum duration for a BSP to adapt its power curve to the given setpoint, from the 
start of the modification 
TRAM,RD 
Time used by a DRPV to adapt its power curve to the given setpoint, from the start of 
the modification 
TMAX,RD Maximum duration of a DRPV’s activation 
TRCT 
Total time that a DRPV needs to achieve the given setpoint, from the arrival of the 
TSO’s notification 
ΔPR1 Flexible power of a DRPV 
ΔPR2 Extra power consumed before the DR action by the DRPV 
ΔPR3 Extra power consumed after the DR action by the DRPV 
TPRE Duration of the preparation for a DR action needed by the DRPV 
TREC Duration of the recovery from a DR action needed the DRPV 
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